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Updating Antiquated Legal Analysis:
Re-Evaluating the Need to Prosecute
Cyberstalkers
Juan Castaños1

S

I. Introduction

ocial media outlets have evolved past the virtual adjective they
are often limited to. Industry leaders like Mark Zuckerberg
are often on record calling their social media creations communities, which many would agree more accurately describes the
function of social media sites.2 Monetary and service transactions,
exchanges of information and ideas, and social networking are a few
of the daily functions of these online communities. Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, and Twitter have connected the world so that at any
given time, someone can have a “friend” in Taiwan, a “connection”
in Australia, and “followers” in Brazil and England. However, not every user appreciates such a degree of social exposure and openness.
According to an independent statistics company, 73% of Americans
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have a social media profile.3 90% of young adults between the ages
18-29 actively use social media.4 It is without doubt that social media
sites are prevalent and part of the everyday life of many individuals. For this reason, social mediums have created privacy settings
which allow greater control to limit how personal property, meaning
an individual’s social media profile, interacts with one’s neighbors
(i.e., other fellow users).5 Specifically, these settings define who you
allow in or keep out of your personal cyber life. This has been done
to address the need of social media consumers, 50% of whom are
worried about their privacy and security on social media sites with
55% of internet users actively trying to hide from specific people or
organizations.6
Kate was constantly reminded of a relationship she was trying to
forget whenever her stalker, her ex-boyfriend’s fiancée, felt the need
to friend request and comment on her personal social media. The
stalker began to follow Kate on Instagram and then on Facebook.
Kate could not understand why someone would torment another human being the way she had been targeted. Regardless of the amount
of “requests” or “views,” Kate never responded. Kate supposed that
silence would deny her cyberstalker future pleasure, thus deterring
further harassment. Kate was unaware that cyberstalking can last
anywhere ranging from one day to twenty-six years with the average
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being for a period of sixteen months.7 The cyberstalking and harassment that she experienced continued through the friends of the
stalker and fake accounts fabricated by the stalker to continue the
abusive tirade. All of the negative abuse continued despite Kate having blocked the stalker and restricting her privacy settings. When the
stalker was able to elicit no response from Kate, she began to target
Kate’s family and close friends.8
Kate’s experience was not an isolated incident. The recent Supreme Court case, Elonis v. United States, demonstrates a deficiency
in the specificity of cyberstalking laws. The Court ruled that in accordance to common standards for proving criminal action, mens
rhea9 is required in order to prosecute a subject according to 18 U.
S. C. §875(c).10 In the words of Chief Justice Roberts, the defendant must transmit “a communication for the purpose of issuing a
threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as
a threat.”11 Because of the indirect nature of cyber interactions, such
an intention is hard to prove. Justice Alito concurred only in part
with majority opinion, for he recognized the shortcoming of current
statutes that do not “explain what type of intent [is] necessary” for a
conviction under 18 U. S. C. §875(c).12 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas highlighted a contradiction between the Supreme Court’s
aforementioned decision and the appellate courts’ popular opinion
that accepts proof of general intent to be a sufficient prerequisite
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for conviction.13 Due to the ambiguity surrounding benchmarks to
be met before obtaining a conviction according to §875(c), victims
and potential victims of cyber harassment and cyberstalking suffer
from a lack of proper protection and redress from the law.
Physical stalking and harassment laws address violations in the
event of indirect contact to individuals, while cyber laws do not. The
lack of specificity with cyber laws present a deficiency in the proper
and fair treatment of the many violations that take place on social
media platforms. While these violations are deemed indirect, they
still present an invasion of personal property and an infringement of
14th Amendment rights. Therefore, it is our opinion that such attacks
against a person’s 14th Amendment rights should be prosecuted with
equal adherence.

II. Background
In the background section, three key areas will be presented.
First, the necessity of protection of personal property will be established. Second, a brief analysis on the terms of use for the different
social media platforms will be conducted, highlighting deficiencies
in current protections. Third, a brief overview of current cyberstalking legislation will be presented. These three subsections provide the
foundation for the argument this article makes, namely, the need for
greater regulation to prevent cyber harassment and cyberstalking.
A. Protection of Personal Property
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has two
main components relating to the protection of property.14 The first
component guarantees the use of fair procedures to improve the accuracy of results where wrongful deprivation of property might take
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place. The other ensures that people feel the government has treated
them fairly when deprivation does occur.15
The Due Process Clause can be summarized as a guarantee of
basic fairness. This process can be witnessed in, but not limited to,
our adversarial system of law. The legal system permits an opportunity for plaintiffs and respondents, prosecutors and defendants, to
be heard by judges and juries; it allows for permissible evidence to
substantiate the claims made by either side. For example, the termination of an employee who is always late for work at a fast food restaurant requires a much different process than a criminal convicted
of murder facing the death penalty. In summary, there are varying
degrees or levels of interest that govern whether or not an interest is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court in Board of Regents v Roth established a key
definition with regards to property interest. David Roth was hired for
a political science teaching position at Wisconsin State UniversityOshkosh for one year. If a university declines to rehire an untenured
professor, the professor in question has to be given notice before the
first of February. This is unlike the situation of a tenured professor who cannot be fired without cause and a written presentation
of charges. The President of Wisconsin State University-Oshkosh
followed the appropriate protocol for an untenured professor. Roth
was discharged and neither given reasons nor opportunity to challenge. Roth brought a suit saying he should have been given reasons
or an opportunity to challenge his termination and claimed that he
was fired because of comments critical of the administration. Roth
felt that this was a violation of his freedom of speech. The Supreme
Court concluded that he had no property interest because he lacked
“a legitimate claim of entitlement.”16 The Court, however, differentiated that if he had been a tenured professor, then he would have
been afforded a more thorough procedure because of the legitimacy
of his claim. Therefore, according to the decision of the Supreme
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Court, property interest must be found in statutory or common laws
to legitimize claims of entitlement.
Facebook Inc., v. New York County District Attorney’s Office
yields an interesting argument highlighting the interaction of the
property interest and legitimate claims of entitlement. At the crux of
the constitutional dispute is whether or not Facebook can litigate on
behalf of its users. A warrant allowing access to the data of 381 users
was issued, and Facebook filed for a motion to quash the warrants
in order to protect the privacy of the users under investigation.17
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court ruled that
Facebook could not raise constitutional issues on behalf of its users.
The true owners of the data were the individuals sharing, liking, and
following, not the provider. Two of the biggest players in regards to a
determination of a property interest online essentially argue for the
same thing: the users are responsible for their pages, and what they
do on them.18
B. Terms of Use
In November 2014, the Science and Technology Committee
commissioned by the United Kingdom’s Parliament conducted an
inquiry regarding the “Responsible Use of Data.”19 As part of this
inquiry, the committee examined the existing terms of use for social media sites and found various shortcomings. The most pressing issue lay in the lack of adequate protection afforded to users of
social media. This deficiency results from the ambiguous phrasing
of prevailing terms of use and is exacerbated by the fact that “terms
and conditions currently favored by many organizations are lengthy
17

Brief of Appellant at 26, Facebook Inc., v New York County District Attorney’s Office, No. 30207-13 (N.Y. S. Ct. Jun. 20, 2014).
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and filled with jargon.”20 The combination of these two factors, the
length and jargon-filled language, “renders [the term and conditions]
unsuitable for conveying an organization’s intent.”21 While the focus
of the inquiry was the examination of ways to improve data privacy
and protection, the findings of this report highlights limitations in
the regulation of social media. Therefore, this foreign report is relevant to the paper’s focus on protection from cyberstalking and cyber
harassment in America.
An overview of the terms of use for social media networks must
first be provided in order to fully comprehend the essential nature
of greater legal protection from cyberstalking and harassment. An
analysis of four social media networks (Instagram, Twitter, LinkedIn and Facebook) shows overlaps in their respective terms of use.
Two major terms of use that are pertinent to this paper will be highlighted.
First, either positively or negatively stated, the four social media
platforms emphasize that content posted on their sites does not belong to them, but instead is the property of the user who posted such
content. Instagram states that they do “not claim ownership of any
Content.”22 Twitter, LinkedIn and Facebook in one form or another
explicitly highlight that the user “[owns] all of the content and information” posted.23 As such, social media networks explicitly declare
that they are “not responsible” or liable for any content on their sites.
Second, an examination of the terms of use for the four social media networks highlights a deficiency in accountability and
therefore repercussion for negative behavior. While regulations are
listed informing the public on what might constitute inappropriate
use of the respective social networking sites, they are ambiguous.
Facebook’s “Statement of Rights and Responsibilities,” as part of its
20

Id. at 22.
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Terms of Use-Rights, INSTAGRAM (Oct. 20, 2015), https://help.instagram.com/478745558852511

23

Statement of Rights and Responsibilities-Sharing Your Content and Information, FACEBOOK (Oct. 21, 2015) https://www.facebook.com/legal/
terms.

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 30, 2016

116

safety clause, states that users “will not bully, intimidate, or harass
any user.”24 What constitutes as bullying, intimidation or harassment, however, remains unspecified. Out of the four social media
platforms, LinkedIn has the most comprehensive list of appropriate
and inappropriate use.
Despite having defined to a certain extent malapropos behaviors,
all of these social networking platforms shirk any responsibility. As
a result, there lacks real detriments or barriers against unfitting behavior, leaving all users exposed to abuse and mistreatment. Actions
or behaviors that violate the Terms of Use are met only with a mild
slap of the hand; the most severe repercussion taken against violations is a discontinuation of the service provided to the consumer.
With the foundational logic highlighting protections that should be
in place and empirical evidence showing the desire from the public
to have greater security, it is time for stronger laws prosecuting cyber
harassment and cyberstalking.25
C. Cyberstalking Legislation
Today, all fifty states have cyberstalking or related laws because
of advancements in technology and the corresponding need to stop
threats and harassment sent electronically.26 It was not until recently
that states began to prosecute cyberstalking cases. Despite slight
variations between the laws for each state, certain similarities exist.
An analysis of these laws yields the following commonalities:
Means—communication by electronic, electro-mechanical,
or electro-optical communication device for the transmission and reception of audio, image, or text.27

24

Id. (see section on Safety).

25

Steven D. Hazelwood & Sarah Koon-Magnin, Cyber Stalking and Cyber
Harassment Legislation in the United States: A Qualitative Analysis, 7
INT’L. J. OF CYBER CRIMINOLOGY 155, 158 (2013).
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Id. at 160-62.
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Specific individual—intentionally or knowingly engages in
a course of conduct directed at a specific individual.28
Intent—to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his
immediate family; or to suffer emotional distress; to have
reasonable knowledge that specific person will be in reasonable fear of bodily injury or will suffer emotional distress.29
Transmission—communication originated or was received
with the intent to annoy, alarm, intimidate, offend, abuse,
threaten, harass, frighten, or disrupt the electronic communication of another.30
Most stalking laws require that a credible threat be made by the perpetrator against the victim or the victim’s immediate family. The
Supreme Court recently ruled in Elonis v. United States that the
credible threat is inseparable from handing down a guilty verdict in
a criminal court. However, statutes that require a showing of a “credible threat” will be problematic when prosecuting crimes where cyberstalking takes place.31 Cyberstalkers often do not threaten their
victims in person; instead, they engage in conduct that, when taken
in context, would cause a reasonable person to fear violence.32 The
credible threat requirement in cyberstalking becomes even more
problematic now that social media sites allow for the stalker, sometimes unknown to the victim, to be located a great distance away and
may therefore appear to have less ability to make a credible threat.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Elonis v. United States exemplifies
28

Id.

29

UT. CODE § 76-5-106.5 (2006).

30

UT. CODE § 76-9-201 (2006).

31
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wp/2015/06/01/the-supreme-court-doesnt-decide-when-speech-becomesa-constitutionally-unprotected-true-threat/.
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the deficiencies that society is facing when it comes to understanding how cyberstalking works and its effects. Stripping cyberstalking
and cyber harassment laws of the reasonableness standard that many
states adhere to, leaves simply a collection of guidelines on how to
use the Internet.

III. Proof of Claim
Social media platforms were originally designed with the noble
intention of creating a connected world. The amount of electronic
data and communication has given opportunity for segments of society to act unethically, unlawfully, and immorally.
As a member of any of the cyber communities, one is entitled
to regulate and control who comes and who goes. “Facebook is an
online social networking service with over one billion users worldwide that allows its users to create an online presence to record all
manner of life events, opinions, affiliations, and other biographical
and personal data.”33 The Supreme Court of New York recognized
the actions of users across social media platforms as users dealing
with their personal property.34 An online presence is an extension
of individuals where within the community you can make acquaintances who make you feel happiness and joy or intense sadness, fear,
and anxiety if you are the victim of cyberstalking. These are people
to people interactions. In recent precedent, it is observable that individuals who believed their actions on social media platforms were
untouchable, were then required to face less than desirable consequences in civil cases.35 It is duly noted that the burden of proof in
civil disputes does not face the scrutiny that criminal convictions must
face, but cyberstalking is a new crime that requires new evaluative

33
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measures for determining whether a violation of the law has taken
place or not.
Consider the following example: First, a home with locks on the
windows, and all doors. There is a security system present as well.
It is safe to make the assumption that the owner of this home has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and has taken the necessary precautions to ensure that his home is protected. Second, a personal
social media profile where the owner has the privacy settings locked
to the maximum level afforded to the user. No one can have access to
the information unless they request permission. The owner also has
a security system in place where his social media account texts or
emails him if logged on from an unfamiliar location. This person has
also taken the necessary precautions to ensure that his cyber home
is protected. Anyone that stalks an individual outside of their physical home will be prosecuted. An individual that cyberstalks an individual using their social media profiles should be prosecuted as well.
In Kate’s situation as previously narrated, she could not escape
the repeated cyberstalking incidents that she was subject to. She
blocked her stalker on every social media website, but the requests
and the unwanted contact continued.36 No one should be subject to
such attacks. Cyberstalking can no longer be seen as a self-inflicted
problem or rationalized as insignificant. Its effects run parallel to
physical stalking. As technology has evolved with respect to the cultural landscape and in its role in facilitating crime, it is important
to consider the distinctions and similarities between offline stalking and cyberstalking. As explained above, the actions of committing the crime, and effects of cyberstalking and physical stalking
run parallel. There are virtually no distinguishing traits other than
cyberstalking requires an electronic device.

IV. Conclusion
Cyberstalking is often seen as a much lesser offense because
interactions online are often seen as play-at-your-own-risk. Those
36
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that operate under the mystified eyes of free speech might argue that
prosecuting someone for stating opinions online is a much graver
constitutional violation. What has been presented in this paper highlights that this is not the case. It is well within the right of an individual who has reasonably tried to avoid a criminal who has the
means, the transmission capabilities, and the intent of carrying out
cyberstalking, to prosecute the perpetrator. Current cyberstalking
laws are deficient in specifically addressing what some consider a
new type of crime. New laws that address the ambiguity of current
legislation will be effective in greatly reducing the presence of cyberstalkers. When a law is broken, there will be consequences. No
guise of free speech authorizes the attacks that people like Kate
have faced.

